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Stuck Between Surplus and Shortage: 
Demand for Skills in the Russian Industry
*
 
In order to remain competitive, firms need to keep the quantity and composition of jobs close 
to the optimal for their given output. Since the beginning of the transition period, Russian 
industrial firms have been widely reporting that the quantity and composition of hired labor is 
far from being close to optimal. This paper discusses what kinds of firms in the Russian 
manufacturing sector are not able to optimize their employment and why. Do they suffer from 
a labor shortage induced by rapid growth, or are they still struggling with employment 
overhang? What are the occupations and skills in which there is a supposed surplus or 
shortage? What factors affect the probability that a firm will report non-optimal employment 
and be unable to solve this difficulty? Where is the labor excess/shortage concentrated and 
what makes it persistent? Finally, we discuss the costs of non-optimal employment. The 
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* The paper is prepared as a part of the ESCIRRU (Economic and Social Consequences of Industrial 
Restructuring in Russia and Ukraine) project funded by the EU (the 6th Framework Program). It uses 
data collected within a joint World Bank - Higher School of Economics survey of Russian 
manufacturing firms conducted in 2004-05. The authors are grateful to I. Goldberg, V. Golikova, K. 
Gonchar, B. Kuznetzov, Ye. Savchenko, Hong Tan, A. Yakovlev, Ye. Yasin for comments and 
suggestions made during various stages of the study. Only the authors themselves are responsible for 
the conclusions and for any mistakes.  
1.  Introduction 
In the transition to a market economy, the Russian workforce has undergone a drastic 
reallocation across industries and occupations.
2 Many specialized and technical skills previously 
acquired by workers during the central planning period have become partially or fully 
depreciated, and are no longer in demand by the industry. Skills mismatches in the labor market 
have become widespread, with sharp shortages of some types of skilled workers coexisting with 
excess supplies of the others. The educational system and specialized vocational and technical 
training institutions in particular seem to be poorly prepared to operate under the new market 
conditions and to supply skills that are required by the market.  
The planned economy is sometimes known as the economy of shortage.
3 With the start of 
transition in the early 1990s, the labor shortage in the Russian labor market abruptly turned into a 
surplus, expressed in growing unemployment and underemployment. By early 1999, 
unemployment reached 13-14 percent, the annual number of hours worked in industry shrunk by 
10 percent, the real wage lost two thirds of its value, and complaints by firms of excess labor 
became universal. According to Fig. 1, based on quarterly data from the Russian Economic 
Barometer (REB) surveys, the proportion of firms reporting excess labor relative to expected 
output was always high prior to the 1998 financial crisis. Over 40 percent of firms noted that 
they had redundant personnel during that period. In comparison, only 5-10 percent of firms in the 
sample reported understaffing relative to expected output.  
Figure 1 


























Proportion of firms overstaffed against expected output, %
Proportion of firms understaffed against expected output, %
Source: REB
 
                                                 
2 According to К. Sabirianova (2001), over 40 percent of all workers in Russia changed their 
occupations in 1991-1998, of which two thirds did this in 1991-95. She termed this mass 
occupational change the "Great Human Capital Reallocation”. 
3 See, for instance, Kornai, János, Socialist economy, Princeton University Press, 1992. 
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The post-crisis (since 1999) economic recovery changed the picture. GDP growth 
activated labor demand, improving labor utilization in all respects and stimulating rapid wage 
growth. However, industrial employment increased in 1999-2001 only marginally, and then 
returned to a downward trend and showed no reaction to significant economic growth. As a 
result, since 1999 the proportion of enterprises reporting a labor surplus has been on the decline, 
while the proportion of firms complaining about a labor shortage has been on the rise. Strong 
recovery in industrial output brought the proportion of overstaffed firms down to less than 10 
percent. Meanwhile, the proportion of firms reporting that they were understaffed for expected 
output started to grow. In 2005, almost every fourth industrial firm reported under-staffing 
against expected output while less than 10 percent anticipated excess labor. According to another 
survey, understaffed enterprises made up over 40 percent while the proportion of overstaffed 
enterprises was close to zero.
4 There was a general consensus that labor and skills shortages were 
a major constraint on output. The labor shortage seemed to have returned to labor market 
analyses. Demographic projections showing a decline in the workforce added to this argument.  
This paper aims to shed light on how “optimal” employment is in the Russian 
manufacturing sector and what the scale, composition and factors of labor surplus and shortage 
are.  
To this end, we will:  
•  Provide a general description of the surplus and shortage of labor;  
•  Determine what factors affect the likelihood of overstaffing or under-staffing; 
•  Analyze the costs for firms to deal with these problems; 
•  Study the association between surplus/shortage and firms' performance; 
•  Analyze the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on the likelihood 
of labor surplus/shortage. 
This paper uses the Russia Investment Climate Survey (ICS) which provides detailed 
insights into these issues. In the next Section we describe the methodology and data. Sections III-
IV use data from the Russia ICS, to characterize the distribution and nature of overstaffing and 
under-staffing for different groups of manufacturing firms. In Section V these micro data are 
analyzed to gain insights into the potential reasons for reported staffing problems, including 
labor turnover, compensation policies and the inhibiting effects of labor regulations. Section VI 
                                                 
4 V. Gimpelson. Shortage of Skills in the Labor Market: Undersupply, Limited Demand or False 
Signals From Employers? Working paper WP3/2004/01. Moscow: Higher School of Economics 
(in Russian). P. 10. 
  4turns to a discussion of various strategies for enterprises to meet their staffing and skill needs, 
including intensification of recruitment activities, using more overtime hours and worker 
training. A final section concludes with some policy implications of the findings. 
 
2.  Methodology and Data 
Before moving to the empirical part of the paper we need to clarify our conceptual and 
empirical understanding of what we call labor “excess” and labor “shortage”. There are no ideal 
measures for these concepts. We need to analyze all available evidence on the state of the labor 
market and to look at their expected behavioral effects. Both “excess” and “shortage” measures 
are often derived as managers’ subjective responses to special surveys. This allows for 
identification of firms recording non-optimal employment, the size of the deviation of 
employment from the optimum, the distribution of “excess” or “shortage” firms by their 
structural (industries, regions, ownership forms, firm age and size) and performance related 
(productivity, profitability, etc) characteristics. For measuring excess we can also look at 
objective indicators such as employers-initiated separations (firings), and for capturing shortage 
we can examine vacancy rates. However, vacancy statistics are usually far from being complete 
and fully reliable, while wide use of downsizing critically depends on the stringency of EPL and 
its enforcement. Though caveats apply, self-reported measures are often the only tools available 
for an in-depth analysis of labor shortage/excess issues. 
Frequent and loud complaints about the shortage of skilled workers and engineers from 
managers can be interpreted as an implicit indication of chronic labor market disequilibrium. If 
demand exceeds supply, then wages should rise in reaction to this shortage, thus boosting supply 
and containing demand. This is expected to bring equilibrium back into the market. If wages are 
fixed by the government and are thus rigid, as was the case under a planned economy, then the 
labor shortage becomes an ingrained systemic feature. However, if wages are flexible – and they 
are extremely flexible in the Russian labor market – the shortage story does not seem so 
convincing and needs special explanation. One of the possible explanations relates to the 
complex interaction between a demand curve that is rapidly shifting upward and the price rise. 
This interaction, which is institutionally mediated, may hinder the market in achieving 
equilibrium.  
We note that in the 1950s the US economy experienced what was called “a shortage of 
engineers and scientists”. This gave rise to various proposals for government intervention into 
the market’s determination of labor quantities and their allocation. Reacting to this problem, 
Arrow and Capron (1959) wrote that “these views stem from our misunderstanding of economic 
theory as well as from an exaggeration of the empirical evidence. On the contrary, a proper view 
  5of the workings of the market mechanism, recognizing, in particular, the dynamics of market 
adjustment to changed conditions, would show that the phenomenon of observed shortage is 
exactly what would be predicted by classical theory in the face of rapidly rising demands.”
5 
“Shortage” emerges when demand for labor rises (seen as a growing alternative wage) but the 
reaction speed of firms in hiring new workers at a higher wage rate is slow. “The reaction speed 
in any particular market depends partly on institutional arrangements, such as the prevalence of 
long-term contracts, and partly on the rapidity with which information about salaries, vacancies, 
and availability of personnel generally available throughout the market”
6. The main conclusion 
from that study was that to deal with “shortages” more efficiently the institutional environment 
should help firms to respond more rapidly by containing costs that arise in dynamic adjustment 
to growing demand. In other words, if market clearing wages rise rapidly, institutions may 
induce “shortage”. 
One of the recent outbursts of “labor shortage” claims is discussed by Freeman (2006). 
He denies these claims, which are based on a flawed logic, as he believes. But aside from the 
logic, there are vested interests that may also matter. Freeman introduces a political-economy 
dimension in this dispute by arguing that “fears of a coming shortage fit with the concerns of 
various groups. Future shortage or not, business will benefit from policies that increase labor 
supply to drive down labor costs. Advocates of education and training see the shortage analysis 
as a way to gain national support for increased spending on training that will benefit workers. 
Politicians can use the shortage analysis to avoid dealing with policies like minimum wages, 
mandated health care spending, labor law reform, or enforcement of labor laws, and the like, by 
endorsing “win-win” education and training policies while sidestepping the fact that someone 
must pay for these investments.”
7  
Since the incidence and scale of shortage usually cannot be estimated directly via reliable 
and objective variables, self-reported measures remain the main evidence on these issues. If 
managers say that their firms are experiencing a “shortage”, then this opinion is usually 
accepted. By aggregating individual responses, we may achieve a general idea of the total 
                                                 
5 Kenneth J. Arrow; William M. Capron Dynamic Shortages and Price Rises: The Engineer-
Scientist Case, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 73, No. 2. (May, 1959), pp. 292-308. 
6 Ibid., P. 301 
7 R. Freeman. Is a Great Labor Shortage Coming? Replacement Demand in the Global Economy. 
Working Paper #12541. September 2006, p.19.  
  6“shortage” that emerges as “a major threat” to economic growth.
8 This conclusion is then likely 
to be disseminated by industry analysts, education and training experts, the mass-media, and 
politicians. In the context of a non-transparent labor market, this adds to upward wage pressure. 
Though self-reported measures are clearly very important and now widely used by 
economists, there is a risk of missing the complete picture by listening to what managers (firms) 
say and ignoring what they in fact do. What they do may reflect what they think, but their actual 
behavior is also shaped by many other factors, including those that are performance related. We 
believe that these two dimensions - subjective (what managers say) and objective (what firms 
do) – should be taken together and analyzed jointly. This approach sheds more light than any of 
the two dimensions taken separately and it defines the line we are going to follow in this paper.  
We rely on data from the Russia ICA survey (ICS) of large and medium sized 
manufacturing firms. The survey was conducted by the World Bank and the Higher School of 
Economics in the second half of 2005.
9 The sample contains around 1,000 firms and is 
representative for the total population of Russian manufacturing enterprises. Data collection 
combined interviews with top-managers and objective economic and financial information about 
their firms. The main descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. General characteristics of the Russia ICS sample 
 Average  Median  Proportion  of  total 
surveyed enterprises 
Industry  - -  8.5 
  Metallurgy  - -  8.8 
  Chemicals  - -  40.1 
  Machinery  - -  8.6 
  Wood processing  - -  9.3 
  Textiles  - -  24.8 
  Food  - -  43.8 
Firm size  - -  25.7 
  Less than 250  - -  15.9 
  251-500  - -  14.7 
  501-1000  - -  23.1 
  More than 1000  - -  28.3 
Foreign shareholder present  - -  21.7 
State's stake in ownership mare than 25%  - -  51.9 
New firm (after 1992)  - -  45.3 
                                                 
8 Rutkowski, J. From the Shortage of Jobs to the Shortage of Skilled Workers: Labor Markets in 
the EU New Member States, Discussion Paper No. 3202, December 2007.  
9 More details about the survey see in: “Building Skills and Absorptive Capacity in Russian 
Enterprises: Competitiveness and Investment Climate Assessment for the Russian Federation”, 
World Bank, 2006; The Russian Industry at the Crossroads. What Prevents our Firms from 
Becoming Competitive, HSE, Moscow, 2007.  
  7Positive R&D spending  - -  - 
Exporter  - -  54.3 
Capacity utilization,%  64.1 70.0  - 
Enterprises with more than 50% equipment 
obsolete  
- -  - 
Rate of investment in fixed capital  33.2 9.1  - 
Profitability, %  9.8 9.4  - 
Value-added per worker, thousand Rubles  201.4 137.9  - 
Average monthly wage, Rubles  6139 5248  - 
Employment growth in 2004, %  -1.5 0  - 
N   1002   
Source: here and below authors’ calculations based on the Russia ICS, 2005. 
 
The issue of optimal staffing was discussed in two different parts of the questionnaire. 
First, respondents were asked to evaluate various constraints on their activity, among which a 
shortage of skilled labor could be chosen as one of the major constraints. Second, the 
questionnaire contained direct and detailed questions about labor surplus and shortage on 
average as well as by skills.  
Respondents to the Russia ICS ranked “Lack of skilled and qualified workforce” as third 
on the list of investment climate constraints to enterprise growth and development (the first 
being taxation and the second being the unpredictability of state regulation). 67 percent of 
surveyed firms considered this constraint to be serious and 17 percent considered it to be the 
most severe.  
However, for a number of reasons we prefer to rely more heavily on alternative estimates 
derived from the direct question about the shortage of skilled labor
10. First, these direct estimates 
could help identify not only the firms that report a labor shortage but also those that report a 
labor surplus. Second, they can be used to analyze both the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of firms' staffing – the problem of labor shortage as well as the problem of shortage 
of skills. Third, they can be used to focus on particular occupational groups (managers, 
professionals, clerks, and workers). Fourth, linking these shortage/surplus estimates to firms' 
structural or performance indicators says more about what kind of firms are more likely to suffer 
from non-optimal staffing. Finally, there is a reasonable critique of the approach-based estimates 




                                                 
10 While answering the direct surplus/shortage question, respondents recognized the incidence of 
a labor shortage at their enterprises much less often than when they chose major investment 
climate constraints from the list.  
11 W. Easterley. The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus Markets in Foreign Aid. 
Center for Global Development. Working Paper No 4. 2002 April. 
  83.  Shortage and Surplus: Where and How Much? 
We begin our analysis of the survey data with a simple description of what respondents 
say about the optimality of current employment in their firms relative to current output.  
Scale of Shortage and Surplus 
The distribution of answers reporting a deviation of current employment from what 
managers would consider the “optimal” level given current output is presented in Table 2. A 
sizeable fraction of Russian enterprises have difficulties in adjusting the size of their workforce 
to the staffing levels dictated by their current output. In the 2005 Russia ICS, about 60 percent of 
surveyed firms rated their current staffing levels as “optimal” relative to current output. 
However, 27 percent of managers reported that their firms were “under-staffed” and 13 percent 
reported “over-staffing”. This makes the ratio of firms with less-than optimal staffing to firms 
with more-than-optimal staffing around 2 to 1. Based on these estimates, one might conclude 
that in the Russian industry the problem of labor shortage is significantly more acute than that of 
surplus.  
Though firms reporting a labor shortage prevail compared to firms with a labor surplus, 
they are generally smaller in size. This hints at the fact that a labor shortage in some firms does 
not mean a labor shortage for the industry in general. Meanwhile, this suggests that these groups 
may face high adjustment costs. Table 3 reports how far firms of both types are from their 
optimal employment size.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of enterprises by optimality of staffing, percent 
Given the current output of your firm, how would you evaluate the current 
employment?    
It is optimal  59.8 
The firm needs more employees than it actually employs (the actual 
employment is lower than optimal)  27.3 
The firm employs more employees than it actually needs (the actual 
employment is above)  12.9 
N  990 
 
Table 3 shows that mean deviations are close while the medians are similar. On average, 
under-staffed firms were short of personnel by 17 percent while over-staffed firms had 15 
percent more workers than they currently needed. The distribution by size of the first group's 
deviation from optimal employment is biased to the left in comparison with the second group. 
The only reason that the mean shortage exceeds mean surplus is because three (3) firms reported 
a labor shortage in excess of 100 percent of their actual employment. If these three particular 
outliers are excluded, the two sub-sample means become almost equal. It is worthwhile to add 
that over-staffed firms are on average around 1.5 times larger than under-staffed firms. As a 
result, the difference between the gross shortage (the sum of insufficient workers over all firms 
  9reporting shortage) exceeds the gross surplus (the sum of redundant workers over all firms 
reporting excess) by only 17 percent. This may mean that the problem of labor misallocation is 
much more general than merely the labor shortage problem. (Evidently, occupational and skills 
characteristics of excess and shortage may also vary significantly.)  
 
Table 3  
Distribution of enterprises by difference between actual and desired employment, percent,  
Difference between actual 
and desired employment 
Labor shortage (% of firms 
reporting labor shortage) 
Labor surplus (% of firms 
reporting labor surplus) 
1-5% 26.9  12.6 
5-10% 33.1  37.6 
10-20% 19.4  36.2 
>20% 19.4  12.6 
N 263  127 
 
Enterprises are concerned not only with overall staffing levels but also with having the 
desired skills mix. This is borne out by which firms report under-staffing or over-staffing in 
several occupational groups: managers, professionals, other white collar employees, blue-collar 
skilled workers and unskilled workers (Table 4). Among the surveyed firms, 95 percent, 81 
percent, 98 percent and 88 percent did not report any shortage of managers, professionals, clerks, 
or unskilled workers, respectively. The shortage of skilled manual workers seems to be more 
acute since it was mentioned by over half of all firms in the sample.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of surveyed enterprises by staffing with various skill groups, percent  
Staffing with this skill group is..   Skill groups 
below optimal  optimal  above optimal  total enterprises 
Managers 4.6  87.7  7.8  100 
Professionals 19.3  72.6  8.1  100 
Clerks 2.0  90.3  7.7  100 
Skilled workers  54.2  41.5  4.3  100 
Unskilled workers  12.5  74.5  13.0  100 
 
Table 5 cross-classifies staffing levels in different skill groups according to whether firms 
describe themselves as being staffed optimally, under-staffed or over-staffed overall. As might 
be expected, firms that have less-than-optimal staffing levels are more likely than other firms to 
report under-staffing in all skill categories, especially skilled workers (97 percent) and 
professionals (38 percent). Interestingly, firms with optimal or more-than-optimal staffing levels 
also report having skill shortages in the same two skill categories (12-15 percent and 37-43 
percent, correspondingly). Therefore, specific skill shortages, especially of professional and 
skilled workers, can coexist with overall optimal or over-staffing at the enterprise level. 
 
  10Table 5. Distribution of surveyed enterprises by general staffing and staffing of particular skill 
groups, percent 
  Firms reporting optimal staffing in different skill categories 
Classification of enterprises 
by general staffing 






-  optimal  93.5 85.2 96.9 62.5 88.4 
-  under-staffed  86.0 59.6 91.9  3.0  65.2 
-  over-staffed  63.8 40.8 56.1 24.6 28.9 
Total  87.7 72.6 90.3 41.5 74.5 
  Firms reporting under-staffing in different skill categories 
Classification of enterprises 
by general staffing 






-  optimal  3.1 11.9 0.7 37.3 5.2 
-  under-staffed  8.3 37.7 4.7 97.0  32.0 
-  over-staffed  3.9 15.2 2.4 42.9 6.6 
Total  4.6 19.3 2.0 54.2  12.5 
  Firms reporting over-staffing in different skill categories 
Classification of enterprises 
by general staffing 






-  optimal  3.4 2.9 2.4 0.2 6.4 
-  under-staffed  5.7 2.6 3.5  0  2.8 
-  over-staffed  32.3 44.0 41.5 32.5 64.5 
Total  7.8 8.1 7.7 4.3  13.0 
 
Firms that reported optimal or less-than-optimal employment levels usually did not 
complain about labor surpluses in particular skill groups. Meanwhile, 32-65 percent of firms 
with more-than-optimal employment reported surpluses in particular skill groups. Almost two 
thirds of them claimed some excess of unskilled workers. Redundant workers that could 
potentially be reallocated towards a more efficient usage of labor can be found in all skills 
groups.  
A tentative conclusion is that labor shortage and labor surplus in the Russian industry are 
likely to coexist and both states bring losses to firms. In most cases, a labor shortage goes hand 
in hand with a shortage of skills.  
Causes for Shortage and Surplus 
Firms experiencing skill shortages tend to cite a number of reasons for under-staffing, 
which are collected in the left panel of Table 6. The four most commonly listed reasons by 
frequency of citation are:  lack of workers with the needed skills in the local labor market (72 
percent), paying low wages compared to other firms (41 percent), high labor turnover (30 
percent), and high competition for workers in the local labor market (23 percent). These reasons 
are consistent with an inadequate supply of workers with relevant job skills in the local labor 
market, high rates of labor turnover, and payment of non-competitive wages and salaries. From 
this list one might conclude that the firms saw the major cause for labor shortage to be on the 
supply side – that the local labor market did not supply enough workers with the requisite skills, 
since reasons from the demand side were mentioned relatively rarely (the main reason here was 
  11the inability of firms to pay a competitive wage and to retain workers already hired).
12 However, 
if we sum up all answers related to demand constraints, this sum exceeds the sum of answers 
related to supply constraints. As our analysis shows, those respondents who chose demand 
related explanations did not indicate a “lack of workers on the local labor market…”.
13 
Therefore, we believe that the conclusion about the undersupply of workforce as the major cause 
for labor shortage is not supported by hard evidence.  
Reasons why the labor surplus remains sizable (the right panel of the Table 6) can be 
grouped as follows: a) deliberate hoarding of labor due to expectations of output growth (pos. 5), 
and b) involuntary hoarding due to significant turnover costs (pos. 1-4, 6). Firms choosing 
answers from group (a) tend to be growing or to be expecting output growth and are likely to be 
in better financial shape. In the second group, the situation was likely to be different and the 
firms expected downsizing. However, downsizing was too costly and therefore hardly feasible 
due to economic, administrative, and social reasons. In other words, high firing costs make this 
strategy inefficient.  
 
Table 6. Major reasons for labor surplus and shortage, percent *  
Reasons for under-staffing    Reasons for over-staffing   
High hiring costs  2.2  High firing costs  18.8 
Lack of workers with needed skills in 
the local labor market  72.2  Resistance of trade unions to 
downsizing  4.7 
High competition for workers in the 
local labor market  23.0  Prohibitions from local or regional 
authorities  2.3 
Expectations for expanding product 
demand  4.8  Fear of conflicts with workers  10.2 
High labor turnover  30.0  Expectations for declining product 
demand  51.6 
Hard/harmful working conditions   18.5  “Social responsibility” of managers  47.7 
Low wages compared to other 
enterprises  41.1 Other  reasons  26.6 
Other reasons  8.5     
N 270  N  128 
* Figures do not sum to 100 % because respondents could select 3 key reasons for under- or over-staffing.  
 
4. Composition of Shortage and Surplus  
How are claims of shortage and surplus distributed across firms? If not randomly, do they 
correlate with particular structural or performance-related characteristics of the firms? In an 
earlier paper, we argued that less efficient and less competitive enterprises were more likely to 
                                                 
12 Psychologically, managers may prefer to put blame on outside circumstances rather than 
recognize their own faults.  
13 There is a negative and statistically significant correlation between choosing these two 
positions. 
  12report a shortage of skilled labor.
14 However, more efficient firms that were also more 
competitive on the labor market faced this problem less frequently. For them, a labor shortage 
meant an undersupply of unique skills and specific experience, which were a product of long-
term development of the market economy and could hardly be produced in an accelerated 
fashion. Examples of these unique skills or experience are top-managers, corporate law or 
finance professionals, marketing or logistics specialists, etc. However, an adequate wage 
premium would allow such skills to be hired in other regions of the country or on the world labor 
market. As we are well aware, many Russian leading companies did exactly that.  
We start considering this issue by providing simple descriptions of firms, the managers of 
which report non-optimal employment. Table 7 reports the distribution of staffing levels for the 
Russia ICS sample with respect to several firm characteristics. The probability of under-staffing 
and the level of under-staffing are highest for firms operating in the textile industry. In this 
sector, over 50 percent of all surveyed firms reported staffing levels below the optimal level, 
with the staffing gap averaging 22.6 percent relative to desired levels. New firms established in 
or after 1992, small enterprises with less than 250 employees, firms operating in the metallurgy 
and machine-building sectors, and government-controlled firms (those with more than 25 percent 
public ownership) are also more likely to report understaffing. Over-staffing is more prevalent 
among large firms (with over 1,000 employees) and firms in the chemicals sector. 
 
Table 7 
Characteristics of Firms by Optimality of Staffing Levels 
Firm characteristics  Optimal 
staffing  Under-staffed Over-staffed 
  % of firms  % of firms  by what 
percentage  % of firms  by what 
percentage 
Total sample  59.8  27.3  17.0  12.9  14.6 
Industry         
  Metallurgy  56.5  29.4  19.5  14.1  13.5 
  Chemicals  52.4  25.0  8.9  22.6  13.7 
  Machinery  57.1  29.6  17.9  13.3  15.3 
  Wood processing  60.7  25.0  11.6  14.3  11.0 
  Textiles  41.9  50.5  22.6  7.5  12.3 
  Food  74.3  15.5  13.2  10.2  16.8 
Firm size          
  Less than 250  62.9  29.0  22.0  8.1  13.6 
  251-500  58.4  28.2  15.2  13.3  16.8 
  501-1000  61.4  22.8  8.6  15.8  15.0 
  More than 1000  51.1  25.2  11.7  23.8  13.2 
Exporter              
  No  62.2  27.6  20.0  10.2  14.4 
  Yes  56.9  26.9  13.4  16.2  14.7 
R&D spending              
                                                 
14 V. Gimpelson. Op. cit.  
  13  No  63.6  26.8  16.9  9.6  14.4 
  Yes  56.3  27.7  17.1  16.0  14.7 
New firm (founded after 
1992)             
  No  60.0  26.5  16.5  13.6  14.6 
  Yes  59.1  30.2  18.6  10.7  14.8 
Foreign ownership           
  No  61.8  26.8  16.9  11.5  14.3 
 Yes  53.3  29.0  17.3  17.8  15.3 
State Stake in Ownership              
Less than 25%  61.0  26.7  14.9  12.3  14.5 
25% and over  56.7  28.7  21.8  14.5  14.8 
Competitiveness              
  High  60.6  24.8  11.6  14.7  15.6 
  Medium  61.2  26.9  15.6  11.9  14.7 
  Low  47.9  35.0  25.0  17.1  14.7 
 
The fact that textile firms lead in the ranking of labor-shortage industries speaks for itself, 
as the textile sector is one of the most crisis-ridden in the Russian economy. The chemical and 
petro-chemical firms enjoyed relatively good financial health. They actually faced the reverse 
challenge, as they inherited a very large stock of employment that seemed to be excessive for 
their given or expected output (1.5 times larger than the sample average).  
Staffing levels are also related to how firms rank their level of self-reported 
competitiveness. Firms that rate themselves as having medium to high competitiveness are more 
likely to have optimal staffing levels (60-61 percent), and less likely to report either under-
staffing (25-27 percent) or over-staffing (12-15 percent). On the other hand, firms that classify 
themselves as non-competitive are less likely to have optimal staffing levels (48 percent) and 
more likely to be under-staffed (35 percent) or over-staffed (17 percent). Whatever the reasons 
that constrain under-staffed firms from employing more personnel, or constrain over-staffed 
firms from discharging redundant workers, non-optimal staffing levels can adversely affect 
firms’ perceptions of their level of competitiveness.  
 



















Optimal  213.5  1.05  10.7  66.2  0.53  6246 
Under-staffed  171.4  0.88  7.6  61.9  -1.05  5620 
Over-staffed  179.8  0.90  10.2  59.7  -4.06  6295 
N  940 940 946 972 974 894 
 
Respondents to the Russia ICS listed non-competitive wages as a reason for their under-
staffing. If this is true, non-competitive wages may account for the inability of firms 
experiencing labor or skill shortages to either retain their skilled workers or to hire additional 
  14skilled workers on the open labor market. Firms with below-average performance may not offer 
competitive wages and therefore be unable to retain their most skilled workers or to fill vacant 
positions with skilled labor.  
Multiple evidence suggests that under-staffing may emerge due to the inability of low-
efficiency firms to pay competitive wages. Gimpelson (2004) used data from a survey of 300 
large and medium size firms in Russia to investigate whether skill shortages were driven by 
supply or by demand-side constraints, and if so, what the enterprises were doing to respond to 
reported skill shortfalls.
15 The analysis suggested that under-staffed firms had levels of labor 
productivity, profitability and average wages that were lower than those in both optimally-staffed 
and over-staffed firms. Furthermore, if low efficiency firms (those with low labor productivity, 
profitability or wages) declared that they had labor or skill shortages, they were more likely to 
use workers with mass (generic) skills supplied by the traditional vocational education system. In 
contrast, more efficient firms were more likely to search for workers with specific or unique 
skills whose supply was limited.  
A similar pattern of association between reported staffing levels and firm performance 
emerged in the 2005 Russia ICS, which includes a much larger sample of industrial enterprises. 
Table 8 compares firms which differed in optimality of staffing by various performance 
indicators, including value-added per worker, labor productivity relative to the industry average, 
profitability, average monthly wage, and rate of job creation in 2004. Compared to the other 
groups, under-staffed firms fared worst in all of these performance indicators. Though under-
staffed, they kept losing employment and showed negative net employment change over the 
previous year. Over-staffed firms, on the other hand, were in slightly better economic shape and 
showed significant (and needed) downsizing over the previous year. The best performance in 
terms of labor productivity and profitability was displayed by firms with optimal staffing levels.  
Table 9. Determinants of staffing: total employees (multi-nominal logit)* 
Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 












Exporter  -0.303  0.161  -0.225  0.186  -0.241  0.168 
New firm (established after 1992)  0.097  -0.189  0.098  -0.151  0.077  -0.188 
Foreign  owned  0.076 0.841** 0.033  0.592*  0.136 0.742** 
Government  control  (>25%)  0.253 -0.077 0.146 0.051 0.076 -0.157 
Employment(log) -0.022  0.460*** 0.043  0.480***  0.038  0.504 
Wages (log)  -0.273**  -0.118           
Value-added per worker (log)      -0.281*** -0.226*      
                                                 
15 See: V. Gimpelson. Op. cit. The survey, conducted jointly by the HSE and the Russian Public 
Opinion Research Center (The Levada-Centre), surveyed 304 industrial enterprises located in 30 
regions of Russia in 2003, with personnel managers as respondents. 
  15Profitability         -1.080**  -1.028***
Industries  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regions  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.336  -26.983  0.348  -26.142  -1.023  -27.476 
Pseudo-R2  0.1437  0.1344  0.1392 
N  894  929  946 
* In tables 9-11 the reference group is enterprises with optimal staffing. 
The association between the incidence of labor shortage and economic underperformance 
is further analyzed in Table 9. It gives estimates from a multinomial logit model where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if actual employment is lower than optimal and 2 if it is excessive. 
Optimally staffed firms are taken as the reference group. All estimates tell us the same story: all 
performance-related variables are negatively and significantly associated with the incidence of 
reporting labor shortage. At the same time, performance indicators are not associated with the 
incidence of reported labor surplus. Overstaffing is more likely to be a function of past 
employment. Due to economic reasons, less efficient firms are unable to hire as many workers as 
they need and to retain them; very large firms are unable to downsize (“to lose extra weight”) 
quickly regardless of their economic performance. This extra weight was inherited from the 
Soviet past and did not emerge from current performance. Getting rid of this “heritage” is 
constrained by current employment protection legislation.
16
Tables 10-12 present the estimation results of a multinomial logit model for professionals 
and skilled workers, for which the proportion of sub-optimally staffed firms is especially large, 
and for unskilled workers.  
Table 10. Determinants of staffing: professionals (multi-nominal logit)* 
Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 












Exporter  0.369*  0.285  0.491**  0.350  0.396*  0.407 
New firm (established after 1992)  0.145  -0.918**  -0.089  -0.780*  -0.067  -0.958** 
Foreign owned  -0.216  0.568  -0.044  0.560  -0.088  0.601 
Government control (>25%)  0.161  -0.115  0.168  0.013  0.157  -0.287 
Employment(log)  -0.012  0.637***  0.001  0.619***  -0.016  0.621*** 
Wages (log)  -0.213*  -0.042         
Value-added per worker (log)      -0.012  -0.213     
Profitability          0.248  -2.135** 
Industries  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.622*  -30.27*** -2.071**  -29.21***  -2.091**  -31.20***
Pseudo-R2 0.1347  0.123  0.1291 
N 890  925  940 
 
                                                 
16 Association between the EPL and labor market behavior of firms is discussed in Section 6 of 
this paper. 
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Table 11. Determinants of staffing: skilled blue-collar workers (multi-nominal logit)* 
Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 












Exporter  -0.022  0.013  0.054  0.155  0.024 0.380 
New firm (established after 1992)  -0.285  0.251  -0.336*  0.269  -0.387** -0.004 
Foreign owned  0.060  0.484  0.039  0.077  -0.026 0.428 
Government control (>25%)  -0.051  -0.050  -0.037  0.081  -0.050 -0.225 
Employment(log)  0.181*  0.359  0.167*  0.306  0.138 0.337 
Wages (log)  -0.323*** -0.319        
Value-added per worker (log)      -0.303*** -0.314    
Profitability          -0.419 -0.462 
Industries  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -1.37* -26.06 -0.190 -24.63  -1.65**  -43.04 
Pseudo-R2 0.1455  0.1378  0.1352 
N 890  924  941 
 
 
Table 12. Determinants of staffing: unskilled workers (multi-nominal logit)* 
Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 












Exporter 0.265  -0.012  0.251  0.068  0.343  0.107 
New firm (established after 1992)  -0.025  -0.305  -0.192  -0.269  -0.015  -0.378 
Foreign owned  0.457  1.063***  0.385  0.998***  0.303  0.951***
Government control (>25%)  0.043  -0.334  0.023  -0.371  0.002  -0.394 
Employment(log) 0.130  0.479***  0.151  0.425***  0.165  0.426***
Wages (log)  -0.082  -0.118         
Value-added per worker (log)      -0.204*  0.027     
Profitability         -1.432**  -0.283 
Industries  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -3.57*** -28.85*** -2.57**  -29.23*** -3.70*** -29.18***
Pseudo-R2 0.1425  0.1347  0.1358 
N 847  879  898 
 
Firms with low productivity tend to have a higher incidence of claims of a shortage of 
skilled workers but not of professionals. Meanwhile, profitability has no statistically meaningful 
effect on the likelihood of a shortage of these groups. Ceteris paribus, exporters need more 
professionals, and firms founded prior to 1992 claim that they need additional manual skilled 
workers. The incidence of a shortage of unskilled labor does not depend on the structural 
characteristics of firms, but it is negatively related to profitability and productivity. The effect of 
average wage is statistically insignificant in this case.  
We now consider the factors affecting the incidence of labor surplus. For professionals, 
two factors are significant in all specifications: the age and size of the firms. Old (established 
prior to 1992) and large firms have a higher probability to need a downsizing of professionals. 
  17Firms that claim to have a surplus of skilled manual workers do not differ much from those with 
optimal employment. However, this could be due to the fact that the first group makes up a very 
small portion of the sample (4.2 percent). Large firms and firms with foreign ownership are more 
likely to have unskilled workers in excess. Though seems strange, the latter can be due to the fact 
that the presence of a foreign investor strengthens efficiency, enhancing pressure on 
management; this pressure may result in a more intense restructuring accompanied by a 
downsizing of unskilled labor (see Table 5). 
Production functions with alternative specifications summarize the results. In addition to 
capital (log), employment (log), and total number of years of schooling as independent variables, 
we used dummy variables to indicate whether a firm has optimal employment (the base 
category), or a surplus or a shortage of manpower. The first specification included dummies for 
shortage/excess in relation to all employees, and other specifications differentiated 
shortage/surplus by skill groups (managers, professionals, clerks, skilled and unskilled workers). 
The log value added was on the left hand side of the model.  
As Table 13 suggests, suboptimal employment is more frequent and more acute for 
economically inefficient enterprises. In fact, there is a strong and negative association between 
the incidence of shortage/surplus and the performance of the firm. In the version of a Cobb-
Douglas production function with general staffing variables, the regression coefficient for the 
labor shortage dummy turns out to be significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient for the 
labor surplus dummy is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimates allow us to conclude 
that, ceterus paribus, under-staffed firms have a TFP lower by 7.5 percent as compared to firms 
that report optimal level of employment, and the TFP of over-staffed ones is lower by 6 
percent.
17 This adds econometric evidence to the fact that the least efficient and competitive 
firms are the most exposed to a shortage or surplus of labor. Though some endogeneity between 
productivity and the incidence of non-optimal employment cannot be excluded, these estimates 
capture the fact that they go together.  
 
Table 13. Productivity and optimality of staffing (augmented Cobb-Douglass production 
function) 
Dependent var.: log VA  All 
employees Managers Profes-




Capital  (Log)  0.246*** 0.258*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.248*** 0.260*** 
Labor  (Log)  0.886*** 0.867*** 0.859*** 0.861*** 0.881*** 0.877*** 
Average years of 
schooling  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Staffing  (optimal)        
                                                 
17 These estimates are very approximate since they are based on the simplest Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  
  18Under-staffing  -0.404*** -0.190 0.000 -0.039  -0.344***  -0.390***
Over-staffing  -0.331**  -0.272 -0.130 -0.216 -0.258 -0.185 
Missing  values  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5.485*** 5.178*** 5.137*** 5.142*** 5.410*** 5.205*** 
N  657 657 657 657 657 657 
R
2 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%;*** Significant at 1% 
 
The versions of production function that include variables related to staffing levels in 
particular occupational groups show that neither a surplus nor a shortage of white collar workers 
(managers, professionals, clerks) affects firm performance. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
all of them have the expected negative sign. However, the impact of skilled blue collar workers 
is statistically significant. Firms reporting a shortage of skilled workers have a TFP 6.5 percent 
lower than firms with the desired number of such workers. More surprising is the fact that they 
display the same pattern (of negative and significant association) for a shortage of unskilled 
workers. Measures of a surplus of skilled as well as unskilled workers show a weak association 
with firm performance.  
In sum, all the available evidence tells the same story. A surplus or shortage of labor, as 
they are reported by firms, reflect their inability to offer competitive wages in order to attract and 
retain workers of the required quantity and skills. If this conclusion is correct, then the main 
problem is seen not in the numerical deficit of workers, including skilled workers, but in the 
inefficiency of the general market selection mechanism. This inefficiency allows unviable 
Russian industrial firms to stay afloat and loudly call for more workers.  
 
5. How should the shortage be rectified?  
Firms that report a shortage of labor can search for a remedy in several complementary 
ways. These include: searching for additional workers in the external market, increasing the 
number of working hours for existing personnel, investing in productivity-enhancing on-the-job 
training of workers.  
The first and most obvious way for overcoming the shortage is to intensify recruitment 
activities. It is reasonable to expect that firms experiencing a labor shortage should lead in job 
creation and lag in job destruction. However, the actual picture appears to be the opposite (Table 
14). In 2004, understaffed firms gained 3 percent of new jobs and lost 6 percent of old ones. 
They created new jobs almost at the same rate as optimally staffed firms did, and they lost jobs at 
the same rate as overstaffed ones. Their main problem that emerged here was their inability to 
retain current jobs and workers. They also faced difficulties in hiring new employees.  
 
  19Table 14. Job creation and job destruction by levels of staffing, 2004, percent* 
Staffing Level  Proportion of firms 
creating jobs 
Proportion of firms 
destroying jobs  Job creation rate  Job destruction rate
Optimal 54.6  45.4  3.2  4.7 
Under-staffed 49.6 50.4 3.1  6.1 
Over-staffed 39.7  60.3  1.8  6.5 
Total 51.3  48.7  2.9  5.3 
* In estimating JC and JD rates, we excluded 1% of firms with maximum job losses and 1% of firms with 
maximum job gains. 
 
Table 15 reports managers’ estimates of the difficulties in searching for and hiring new 
workers from various occupational groups. The most serious difficulties (the number of 
respondents who chose “very serious problems” or “problems cannot be solved within 
acceptable time periods”) arise when firms search for skilled manual workers. Around 37 percent 
of respondents reported very serious difficulties. (Note that although about 50 percent of 
surveyed firms reported a shortage of skilled workers, a much smaller proportion of them 
recognized serious difficulties in searching or hiring!) This proportion does not depend on firm 
size, age, or dynamics of employment, but it is higher for state-owned firms, among which every 
second firm reports critical difficulties. 
 
Table 15. Difficulties in searching and hiring workers, by major occupational groups, % 






arise but not 
often 
Difficulties arise 
frequently but they 
are solved within 









Managers 43.6  27.5  14.1  13.4  1.2 
Professionals 34.2  29.1  22.5  13.2  0.9 
Clerks 79.8  12.5  5.1  2.5  0 
Skilled workers  15.0  19.0  28.6  33.5  3.4 
Unskilled workers  67.4  13.6  10.9  4.8  0.5 
 
Similar estimates for managers and professionals are around 15 percent. For 
professionals this estimate is about the same for all groups of firms. For managers, it reaches 25 
percent for the largest firms in our sample, around 33 percent for firms established after 1965 
and 20 percent for firms creating new jobs. Not surprisingly, searching for and clerks and 
unskilled workers is the easiest, and 84-92 percent managers reported either no difficulties with 






  20Table 16. Distribution of enterprises under-staffed with various skill groups, by degrees of difficulty in 
searching for and hiring various skill groups, percent 










they are solved 
within short 












Managers 57.1  15.4  18.1  8.5  0.8  1.8 
Professionals 4.2  24.3  33.3 35.4  2.6  3.1 
Clerks 36.8  15.8  31.6  15.8  0.0  2.3 
Skilled workers  1.5  10.3  31.3  51.7  5.2  3.5 
Unskilled workers  7.8  23.3  43.1  24.1  1.7  2.9 
 
How do complaints of a shortage of labor in particular occupational groups relate to 
actual difficulties in searching and hiring? Table 16 suggests that this association appears to be 
quite weak in most cases. Only 10 percent of firms reporting a shortage of managers faced actual 
difficulties in searching for managers. For clerks, this indicator is under 20 percent; for unskilled 
workers, it was slightly above 25 percent. For professionals and skilled workers only, it reached 
worrisome percentages of 40 and 60, respectively. But even these estimates suggest that about 
half of the firms reporting a shortage of skilled labor find the employees they need without 
serious difficulties.  
An alternative strategy to remedy a labor shortage is to extend working hours and 
optimize the utilization of working time. However, as Table 17 shows, under-staffed firms had 
the largest losses of working time. Their losses made up 16 percent of their annual amount of 
working hours, against 12-13 percent reported by optimally staffed or over-staffed firms. 
Additional vacations, absences, and sick leaves were among the main reasons for 
underutilization of working time. This raises the question of whether the labor shortage claimed 
by these firms emerges as a consequence of their own inability to efficiently utilize their existing 
workforce. In any case, under-staffed firms behave in a far different way than one would expect. 
Instead of making working hours longer, these firms tend to have (or force?) their employees to 
work even shorter hours.  
 
Table 17. Losses of working time by levels of staffing (percent of the total annual number of 
working hours) 












Optimal 0.4  3.2  6.8  1.2 0.7  12.3 
Under-staffed 0.1  3.8  8.5  2.4  1.4  16.2 
Over-staffed 0.0  2.6  7.0  2.7  0.9  13.2 
Total 0.2  3.3  7.3  1.8  0.9  13.5 
 
  21One possible solution to skill shortages in the local labor market is to train or upgrade the 
skills of the existing workforce
18. Investments in in-service training are an important 
precondition of competitiveness.
19 They build special skills and knowledge that are 
complementary to technology. Correspondingly, one could expect that firms with a labor 
shortage tend to invest more in in-service training. Is this strategy used by such firms? 
Simple tabulations suggest that about 70 percent of manufacturing enterprises in the 
sample provide employees with in-service training. If compared to training incidence in other 
BRIC countries, Russia trails behind China and Brazil, though it is far ahead of India.  
However, these simple estimates of training incidence are misleading because Russian 
firms that report training actually provide training to very few of their employees. Conditional on 
the firm providing training, the survey suggests that managers, professionals and skilled workers 
are the three skill groups most likely to benefit from in-service training. On average, only 9-10 
percent of managers and professionals and about 7-8 percent of skilled workers receive formal 
training. These figures seem to be extremely low by international comparisons, and suggest that 
in-service training practices are not firmly entrenched among Russian firms.
20 Thus, while many 
more Russian firms train, they provide training to a relatively small percent of their workforce as 
compared to other countries. Another important finding is that on average formal in-service 
training provided by the Russian enterprises is rather short – no more than two-three weeks.  
                                                 
18 The hiring versus retraining option is discussed by Denisova (2005), based upon a survey of 
1,000 industrial enterprises in 2004. In her survey, 56 percent of firms noted that retraining 
existing workers is the most efficient way to meet skill shortages, 35 percent state that hiring 
from the external market is preferable, and 25 percent prefer cooperation with education and 
training institutions to provide trained personnel. See: Lazareva O., Denisova I., and S. Tsuhlo. 
Hiring or Retraining: the Russian Firms’ Experience. Working paper WP3/2006/11. Moscow: 
Higher School of Economics (in Russian). 
19 O. Lazareva et al. Op. cit.; «Building Skills and Absorptive Capacity in Russian Enterprises: 
Competitiveness and Investment Climate Assessment for the Russian Federation», World Bank, 
2007.   
20 In Malaysia, a rapidly growing East Asian country, a World Bank study (1997) that also 
ranked skill shortages estimated that 24 percent of managers, 32 percent of professionals and 
technicians, and between 13 and 16 percent of production workers received formal in-service 
training. See World Bank (2004), “Malaysia: Firm Competitiveness, Investment Climate and 
Growth”. 
  22Are firms that report under-staffing more likely to train workers in order to meet skill 
shortfalls? We might expect the answer to be positive, yet surprisingly it is not. As Table 18 
shows, 67-69 percent of firms with a labor shortage train their workers, and this does not differ 
from training in optimally staffed firms. In fact, firms that identified themselves as being over-
staffed were more likely than other firms (those with optimal staffing or under-staffing) to 
provide in-service training. Among them, 84 percent reported that they trained their personnel. 
These firms were also more active in in-house training of particular occupational groups. One 
explanation, consistent with Table 5, is that skill shortages in specific skill groups can co-exist 
with overall optimal or over-staffing, so even over-staffed firms train. Another explanation is 
that this group consists of large firms, many of which have their own in-house training 
institutions and programs. Large firms can also benefit from economies of scale, since training 
costs per worker will be lower than for smaller enterprises. Compared to the two other groups of 
firms, firms with a labor shortage did more training for unskilled workers and less for managers 
and skilled workers. 
However, the duration of training was longest at under-staffed firms and was 4 weeks on 
average, against 2-3 weeks at other firms. This could be due to the fact that these firms were only 
able to attract a lower quality labor force that needed longer training even for basic tasks.  
At all firms regardless of their staffing (surplus/optimal/shortage), there were 
inconsistencies between demand for skills and in-firm training. As Table 18 suggests, managers 
and professionals were trained most frequently, though the shortage of these workers was not the 
most acute. However, the priority of these groups is easily explained, since investments in their 
specific human capital can bring higher returns than investments in blue-collar workers or clerks. 
Interestingly, though complaints of understaffed firms of a shortage of skilled manual workers 
are almost universal (97 percent), they do not lead to more investments in training this group of 
workers. Only one third of these firms invested in the in-firm training of skilled workers.  
 
Table 18. In-service training by staffing levels 
 
Proportion of enterprises 
providing any in-firm 
training, per cent 
Proportion of employees 
trained over the year, 
percent (conditional on the 
provision of in-firm 
training)  
Average duration of in-firm 
training in weeks 
(conditional on the 
provision of in-firm 
training) 
  Enterprises with optimal staffing 
Total employees  67.2  -  - 
Managers 40.5  8.8  2.7 
Professionals 41.0  9.0  3.2 
Clerks 14.9  1.0  2.2 
Skilled workers  34.8  8.0  3.6 
Unskilled workers  12.8  1.2  2.9 
 Under-staffed  enterprises 
  23Total employees  68.9  -  - 
Managers 41.1  7.5  3.1 
Professionals 47.0  9.4  3.3 
Clerks 11.9  1.3  1.8 
Skilled workers  34.1  5.7  3.7 
Unskilled workers  13.7  1.8  4.1 
 Over-staffed  enterprises 
Total employees  84.1  -  - 
Managers 54.7  11.0  2.7 
Professionals 62.5  13.5  2.2 
Clerks 18.8  1.1  1.5 
Skilled workers  39.8  7.8  2.8 
Unskilled workers  16.4  1.1  2.1 
 
So why do Russian firms not train in-house to meet skill shortfalls? The importance of 
various training correlates can be investigated within a regression framework using a probit 
model. The model estimates the probability of in-service training by regressing the “any formal 
training” variable on a set of explanatory variables, including measures of firm size, the share of 
workers with higher education, and other firm attributes such as export orientation, R&D 
spending and foreign or government ownership. A corresponding set of regressions were 
estimated separately for the probability of in-house training and external training. 
 
Table 19. Determinants of in-service training and training by source (probit models, marginal 
effects) 
Dependent variable:   dummy for training  Any training   In-house training  External training 
% workers with higher education  0.002  0.000  0.002* 
Positive R&D spending  0.052  0.066*  0.047 
New firm (established after 1992)  -0.021  0.004  -0.058 
Exporter 0.067*  0.079**  0.078** 
Some foreign ownership  -0.072  -0.033  -0.092* 
Government control (>25%)  0.056  0.002  0.116** 
Firm size dummies (less than 250)       
251-500 0.113*** 0.089** 0.124*** 
501-1000 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.216*** 
More than 1000 0.215***  0.314***  0.269*** 
Staffing level (optimal)       
Under-staffed 0.053 0.073* 0.031 
Over-staffed 0.133*** 0.138**  0.124** 
Industries Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regions Yes  Yes  Yes 
Missing values  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 964  969  963 
Pseudo R2  0.1464  0.1390  0.1396 
 
The regression results reported in Table 19 confirm the importance of several factors that 
shape the demand for in-service training provision. First, the likelihood of in-service training is 
higher in larger firms (those with over 250 employees). Second, export-oriented firms and, to a 
lesser extent, firms that engage in R&D, are also more likely to train. Employers that export have 
  24greater incentives to train their workers to produce high quality products meeting the exacting 
standards of foreign buyers, and to increase labor productivity to meet competitive pressures 
(Tan and Batra 1995; Batra and Stone 2004). 
The second and third columns of Table 19 highlight differences in the determinants of 
external and in-house training. Training from external sources tend to be more common among 
firms where the government has controlling interests, and in export-oriented firms with a high 
share of highly educated workers. This reliance on external training appears to be a carry-over 
from the pre-transition period, when many state-owned enterprises had arrangements to hire 
specifically-trained graduates from related vocational and technical training institutions. By 
contrast, in-house training is shaped less by the share of highly educated workers, and more by 
the firm’s export orientation and R&D spending.  
As far as shortage/surplus variables are concerned, a labor shortage seems to stimulate in-
house training but has little impact on provision of more expensive external training. In addition, 
any external training provides general skills and knowledge which are portable and can be used 
outside the firm. Expectations that trained workers may behave opportunistically may de-
stimulate investments in external training. Ceteris paribus, over-staffed firms provided some 
training 13-15 percent more frequently than firms that were optimally staffed. This confirms the 
conclusion made earlier that a general surplus does not exclude a shortage of specific skills and 
experience. There are different sources of demand for training, not just for making up numerical 
labor shortfalls, but also for meeting the specific skill needs for exporting and new technology, 
as suggested by Table 19. 
 
Table 20. Determinants of in-service training for various skill groups (probit models, marginal 
effects) 




Positive R&D spending  0.088**  0.065* 0.054* -0.010  0.010 
New firm (established after 
1992)  -0.010 -0.023 0.011 -0.014 -0.019 
Exporter  0.045 0.041 -0.014 0.032 0.007 
Some foreign ownership  0.020  0.005  -0.005  -0.030  0.007 
Government control (>25%)  0.044  -0.036  0.032  0.008  0.046 
Firm size dummies (less than 
250)       
251-500 0.099**  0.127***  0.030  0.080*  0.083*** 
501-1000 0.247***  0.195***  -0.022  0.139***  0.024 
More than 1000  0.224***  0.205***  0.085**  0.196***  0.118*** 
Staffing level (optimal) 
Under-staffed  -0.050  -0.007 --- -0.016  -0.001 
Over-staffed 0.045  0.200***  0.045  0.076  0.000 
Degrees of difficulty searching for and hiring different skill groups (no difficulties) 
Some difficulties, or difficulties 
are solved within short periods  0.037 -0.002  0.093***  0.097* 0.009 
  25of time 
Very serious or unsolvable 
difficulties  0.128** 0.122**  -0.024  0.109*  0.052 
Industries  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Missing  values  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  982 980 873 982 827 
Pseudo  R2  0.1056 0.1012 0.0938 0.1046 0.0979 
 
Table 20 analyzes how firms use training to overcome labor shortages for particular 
occupational groups. Larger firms train more in all occupational groups and benefit from 
economies of scale. Innovative firms are more likely to train, but white-collar workers only. 
However, there are no visible effects of staffing variables on the training activities of particular 
occupational groups. The only relevant finding is that training is more common at over-staffed 
firms. Another interesting tendency is that high search and hiring costs emerge here as a main 
stimulus to provide training. This effect is statistically significant for all occupational groups 
except unskilled workers. However, in any case it can be argued that under-staffed firms are not 
more likely to invest in firm-specific skills than optimally staffed or over-staffed firms. This 
questions the hypothesis that employers’ claims of a shortage of labor or particular skills provide 
reliable signals.  
As a preliminary conclusion, it seems that firms that claim to experience a labor shortage 
do little of what might be expected given a physical lack of the requisite workforce. They do 
little to minimize the losses of working time or to have employees work more hours, they invest 
less in training, and they are rather passive in hiring. This bundle of behavioral responses 
complements the image of these firms as market losers (non-competitive in the labor market).  
 
6. Non-optimal Employment and EPL Stringency 
Russian enterprises may also be constrained from meeting reported skill shortages by 
employment protection legislation (EPL). There is an emerging literature suggesting that overly 
strict EPL can negatively affect hiring and firing, stifle job creation and lead to higher 
unemployment. Labor legislation (regarding minimum wages, social benefits and guarantees, 
employment contracts, and layoff regulations) can change labor costs for employers and, if 
strictly enforced, weakens incentives to hire new workers or discharge redundant ones even 
when warranted by labor demand. Hence, non-optimal employment can persist if labor turnover 
costs are prohibitively high. Firing costs incurred by EPL slow adjustment.
21 Firing excess 
workers may cost too much and take too much time, thus inducing employers to keep excess 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the excellent survey by J. Addison and P. Teixeira, “The Economics of 
Employment Protection”. IZA, DP 381, October 2001.  
  26labor or press workers to quit voluntarily. Firing costs become hiring costs since employers 
cannot exclude falling demand in the future.  
In the IC survey, respondents reported on various constraints that hindered enterprise 
activity and also evaluated the relative importance of these constraints by using a 5-score scale. 
Only around 5 percent of respondents recognized the current “regulations of industrial relations” 
regime as a serious or very serious constraint on production. Adding those who consider these 
regulations to be a significant constraint makes up around 17 percent of all firms surveyed. 
Compared to other constraints, this does not seem to be a real barrier. The results vary little 
across the major groups of firms, and this seems to confirm that the EPL stringency is not a 
serious issue. However, this conclusion is premature.  
First, this negative rating of IC barriers is led by a few general characteristics of the 
economic environment and regulations for which the “regulations of industrial relations” emerge 
as a particular case. Second, “the regulations of industrial relations” may be considered by top-
managers to be collective bargaining procedures or relationships with unions, which are not in 
fact a constraint. Third, a shortage of skilled labor is considered generally to be a serious 
constraint, and this, its turn, may be associated with the regulations of industrial relations.  
We study the impact of labor regulations on economic activity in more detail using the 
question about what EPL rules and procedures create the most serious difficulties (Table 21). 
 
Table 21. Distribution of surveyed enterprises by answers to the question "Which labor 
regulations create major problems for your enterprises?", percent  
Staffing levels  Labor regulations  Total 
Under-staffed Optimal  Over-staffed 
Hiring and firing rules   18,8  15,9  18,2  25,8 
Use of short-term contracts 11,8  10,4  12,3  11,7 
Working time regulations  15,3  13,7  15,5  17,2 
Minimum wage rules  10,6  13,0  10,0  10,9 
Social benefit provisions  12,5  12,6  10,1  17,2 
Rules on timing of wage payments  12,1  12,6  10,1  17,2 
Relations to TU  4,1  3,0  4,7  3,9 
Hiring of foreign workers  20,2  27,8  18,2  14,8 
Others 3,1  3,0  3,0  3,9 
There are no such rules  39,7  35,6  42,6  37,5 
N 1002  592  270  128 
 
Table 21 shows that one fifth of all respondents reported that rules on hiring foreign labor 
created serious difficulties, 19 percent indicated hiring and firing rules and 15 percent stressed 
  27the problems that arise from working time regulations. Only 40 percent believed that labor 
regulations did not create any major problems for their enterprise
22.  
Interestingly, firms that were over-staffed tended more frequently (than other firms) to 
select hiring and firing rules, working time regulations, and rules on timing for wage payments 
as the most constraining of all labor regulations. This is understandable since exactly these firms 
(with excess staff) need to downsize more than others. On the other hand, firms with under-
staffing tend to stress minimum wage rules, and rules governing the hiring of foreign workers as 
creating difficult problems for them. This comes as an additional illustration for their policy 
towards hiring cheap and low-skilled labor. 
Labor adjustment costs induced by the EPL are likely to make it more difficult for firms 
to search for and hire needed skilled workers. Table 22 reports estimates from an ordered probit 
model in which the 5-score index of difficulty (ranking of 1 to 5, where 5 is for the maximum 
difficulty) of searching for and hiring skilled labor is regressed on the index of EPL as a 
constraint (sum of different EPL components that respondents indicate as problematic), wage 
levels in the firms and other enterprise characteristics that might shape skills demand. (As 
independent variables, we use either an index summing up EPL stringency perceptions (columns 
2 and 3 of the table) or the dummy for the position that “the EPL does not contain any rules and 
norms that can create additional difficulties”. The model is estimated separately for professionals 
and for skilled workers, the two groups that are in greatest demand.  
The results provide evidence that the EPL index is positively associated with the actual 
difficulties firms may experience in searching for and hiring professionals and skilled workers. 
The higher the sum of EPL rankings as a constraint, the more likely the firms are to report search 
and hiring difficulties for both professionals and skilled workers. Firms that are able to 
circumvent EPL, on the other hand, are less likely to rank searching and hiring skilled labor as a 
problem. The results in Table 22 also confirm that firms paying non-competitive wages are also 
more likely to report difficulties in searching for and hiring skilled labor. This corresponds to the 
conclusion made earlier that the recruitment (and hiring) and retention of skilled employees 
                                                 
22 There are simple and quasi-legal ways in Russia to deal with the EPL constraints and turn 
labor-management relations into a quasi “employment-at-will” practice. First, employers can 
pressure workers to quit voluntarily. Second, there are informal practices of asking workers to 
submit an application to quit voluntarily when first being hired. This allows managers to date the 
application themselves and initiate a “voluntary” quit at any time and at no costs. These and 
certain other informal practices can result in a high labor turnover driven by quits with almost no 
lay-offs. 
  28depend on demand constraints. Another interesting fact that follows from Table 22 is that small 
and medium sized firms (up to 250 employees) are less likely to have recruitment problems. This 
can be explained by the fact that the true regulatory regime for small firms is rather flexible and 
these firms feel the pressure from EPL relatively less. 
 
Table 22. EPL as a constraint on hiring skilled labor (ordered probit) 
Dependent variable:  Difficulty in search for and hiring labor 
  Professionals Skilled workers
Log(wages) -0.093*  -0.199***  -0.197*** 
Government control (>25%)  0.218**  0.021  0.023 
Some foreign owner  -0.153  -0.036  -0.042 
Small firm (<250 employees)  -0.301***  -0.166**  -0.162** 
Positive R&D spending  0.208*** 0.044  0.033 
New Firm (established after 1992)  0.078  -0.115  -0.122 
EPL index  0.108***  0.094***  - 
EPL is not a constraint  -  -  -0.306*** 
Industries Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regions Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 896  898  898 
LR chi2  123,85  181,13  189,56 
Note: Z-values in parentheses and * statistically significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** 
significant at 1%. EPL index is the sum of rankings for EPL related difficulties.  
 
7. Conclusions 
During the 1990s, many observers of the Russian labor market highlighted the issue of 
widespread under-employment, hidden unemployment, and underutilization of labor. The 
economic growth and recovery in the 2000s brought the opposite conviction that a shortage of 
labor and skills had emerged as a crucial constraint for growth. This conviction strengthened 
over time and by 2005-2006 had become a consensus. For many Russian politicians, bureaucrats, 
industrialists, and education specialists, this thesis provided a valid argument to call for stronger 
governmental intervention in the labor market and education. According to an extreme version of 
this view, the state should step in and participate more actively in deciding whom, how, and what 
skills the educational system should teach. This conclusion fits many vested interests since 
bureaucrats always want to acquire more redistributive power and employers seek ways to shift 
some training costs onto the state budget. These ideas, which concern the interests of millions of 
citizens in the country, assume that significant budgetary funds may come up for grabs. Hopes of 
various social groups for being allowed to share the pie shape the social consensus on relevant 
policies. This concentration of vested interests is not unique to Russia and was mentioned by R. 
Freeman in relation to the US.
23 Since the outcomes of such policies take years to be seen, their 
                                                 
23 Freeman, R. Is a Great Labor Shortage Coming? Replacement Demand in the Global 
Economy. Working Paper No. 12541, September 2006. 
  29lobbyists do not expect any personal responsibility for plausible misadvise. That is why the 
thesis on labor shortage deserves to be carefully scrutinized and cannot be taken for granted.  
In the 2000s, as labor shortage claims were loudly heard in many transition countries, it 
would seem logical to consider all these cases together.
24 However, this would be erroneous. If 
in the CEE countries that joined the EU the labor shortage could emerge as a consequence of the 
accession and subsequent out-migration to more developed EU states, the Russian situation was 
somewhat different. Unlike the new EU countries, Russia enjoyed a certain increase in the 
efficient labor supply, but not a decrease. However, if separate EU countries are considered as 
“mega-firms”, we can see some parallels with our story: labor shortage claims often come from 
the least efficient and competitive agents that are unable to offer competitive remuneration. State 
borders can hide the fact that complaints come from low efficiency areas.  
At the moment of writing, the Russian economy (as well as all other major economies) 
was plunging into a deep economic recession. It is highly probable that the first reaction of the 
labor market will again be an accumulation of more excess labor. In any case, all institutional 
constraints and incentives that induced firms in the 1990s to underutilize their workforce are still 
in place. How firms with a shortage or excess of labor will react to the crisis remains to be seen.   
What does our empirical study show? First of all, it reveals a sharp mismatch between the 
states of the labor market that have been painted by using “objective” indicators and by 
managers’ self-reported perceptions. Managers are very much concerned with shortages of labor 
in general as well as by shortages of particular skills. However, the behavioral responses of their 
firms to tentative shortages do not provide any proof for this claim.  
Managers that name shortage to be an investment constraint usually do not link it to the 
particular wage levels at their own firms, but rather explicitly recognize low wages as a factor 
contributing to shortage. Interesting nuances come with a more detailed analysis. Of those 
managers who complain of a shortage, only two thirds explain the shortage by a lack of needed 
skills in the market. Half of those who nevertheless claim a lack of needed workers in the labor 
market actually face no difficulties themselves in searching for and hiring new workers with the 
required characteristics. If these caveats are accounted for, the scale of expected labor shortage 
gradually shrinks and does not seem threatening anymore.
25  
                                                 
24 Rutkowski, J. From the Shortage of Jobs to the Shortage of Skilled Workers: Labor Markets in 
the EU New Member States, Discussion Paper No. 3202, December 2007 
 
25 D. Mitchell, in discussing the labor shortage claims widely reported in the 80s, also notes that 
a more accurate and detailed look at survey data dismisses these claims as groundless. (Mitchell, 
  30Labor shortage is understandable if it emerges as a problem of rapidly expanding firms. If 
a firm grows too fast, it may face difficulties in searching for and hiring new workers with the 
needed skills, as this requires significant time and entails costs and thereby becomes an obvious 
constraint for further growth. Basically, the firm wants to get more than a tight labor market can 
offer. However, most Russian firms with a labor shortage tell us a completely different story, 
since they are more likely to downsize but not to expand. In general, they are inefficient and 
loss-making, they employ a low quality and low paid workforce, they are technologically 
obsolete and gradually losing jobs. This general conclusion emerges from the complex study of 
various associations between performance and an excess or shortage of labor.  
Even more paradoxical is the fact that firms reporting a labor or skills shortage seem to 
expend little effort in solving the problem. In fact, they do little to attract new workers and to use 
working hours more efficiently; they under-invest in training and keep using a low-wage policy 
instead of trying to attract better workers through offers of higher wages and better training. The 
contrast between how much firms complain of a shortage of skills and how little they in fact do 
in order to fill the gap looms large and deserves a special study.
26 Taken together, various pieces 
of the story hint at the fact that wage levels that can be significantly lower than outside options 
available to workers, largely drive the labor shortages in these firms.  
How can we explain the sharp contrast between widespread beliefs and our survey-based 
conclusions? In a competitive market environment inefficient firms rapidly lose in the 
competition for better workers to more efficient firms, they tend to quit the market and their 
voice is not heard anymore. If firms are vocal in their shortage claims they are likely to be 
expanding quickly. The current Russian story is completely different. Market selection works 
poorly, thus allowing inefficient firms (“unburied but dead”, according to B. Kuznetzov) that 
have been losing labor to remain afloat for long time. It is these firms that become the major 
disseminators of complaints of labor shortage. Since their population remains significant and 
they are often important regional employers, their voice remains undeservedly loud and 
pressures the government for state funded vocational training and other forms of assistance. Like 
a fog, this informational noise hides the real problems that more efficient firms may face.  
Summing up this part of the story, it can be said that non-competitive, inefficient, and 
low wage firms are the most vocal in shortage claims. Their fragile market position explains why 
                                                                                                                                                             
D., Wage Pressures and Labor Shortages: The 1960s and 1980s. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, Vol. 1989, No.2) 
26 H. Tan, Y. Savchenko, V. Gimpelson, R. Kapelyushnikov, A. Lukyanova. Skills Shortages 
and training in Russian enterprises, IZA DP 2751, April 2007.  
 
  31they are unable to raise their wages and why they keep losing jobs, while they benefit from the 
inefficiency of bankruptcy regulations that allow them to stay afloat. From a welfare point of 
view, it would be less efficient if they could hire as many additional workers as they want. In this 
respect, the problem of shortage emerges as a symptom of a severe institutional inefficiency.  
Mass complaints of a shortage are only a part of the total picture. Our study shows that 
shortage claims in the Russian industry coexist with excess claims reported by a large segment of 
firms. Excess labor is also troublesome but is more likely to be an attribute of very large firms 
privatized in the 90s. For these firms, losing some fat is vitally important for retaining market 
competitiveness. Their downsizing is institutionally constrained by current employment 
regulations that seem to overprotect workers that are in excess in relation to expected output.  
The main conclusion that emerges from this study is that difficulties for firms in 
maintaining the optimal employment mix are grounded in the institutional environment, which 
does not allow for a quick reallocation of labor from pockets of inefficiency to pockets with 
more efficient use. If this conclusion is correct, then any attempts to substitute a complex 
restructuring of market institutions with detailed governmental intervention into vocational 
training will bring even more inefficiency and a further deterioration of the competitiveness of 
Russian industry.  
We strongly believe that the major reason for widespread and loud claims of shortage in 
the modern Russian economy is not a physical shortage of labor, but rather weak selection 
mechanisms. Thus the key issue is not a shortage or excess of labor in the Russian market but an 
excess of nonviable firms and a shortage of highly efficient firms. This excess/shortage distorts 
the labor market. The major solution is seen in creating the institutional conditions that would 
stimulate a more efficient reallocation of labor. 
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